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Abstract
„App platforms” are electronic software distribution markets for mobile devices like smartphones or
tablets. They have gained popularity after Apple launched its AppStore in 2008. Since then, app
platforms have transformed the entire mobile communication industry including mobile network
operators, device producers, software suppliers, content providers, advertisers, etc.
Platforms (like AppStore) that intermediate between two distinct groups of customers connected
through indirect network effects can be analyzed effectively using the theory of two-sided markets. The
interdependencies of customers, platforms and developers require consideration of strategic issues not
present in traditional models. These issues may pertain to all development phases, including platform
design, launch and competition and thus, have an effect on existing and new business models in this
sector.
Economics literature on two-sided markets focuses on theoretical analysis, paying not much attention
to managerial implications. Strategic management literature, on the other hand, rather provides
practical guidelines. Within this paper, we discuss strategic issues arising in the app platform
industry, combining these streams of literature. Based on a thorough analysis of the key stakeholders
in the app platform industry (platform owner, developers, and users), we use our findings to provide
management recommendations and discuss probable evolutions of the industry.
Keywords: Business models, two-sided market, app platform, mobile industry, pricing strategy,
competition.
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Introduction

„App platforms” are electronic software distribution platforms for mobile devices like smartphones or
tablets. They have gained popularity after Apple launched its AppStore in July 2008. Since then, app
platforms have transformed the entire mobile communication industry including mobile network
operators, device producers, software suppliers, content providers, advertisers and so on (Taylor,
2009). Although the advantage of AppStore seemed to be incontestable, other app platforms like
Google's Android market managed to enter the market and achieve high popularity (comScore
Reports, 2011). More platforms followed Apple and Google, forming coalitions and trying to create
niche markets. This lead to differentiation and further development of the business model.
App platforms are not a single example but a part of a large-scale change. During the last decade,
platforms became the „invisible engines“ of our economies (Evans et al., 2006). Amazon, eBay, and
Google have advanced to top brands worldwide. Following Gawer and Cusumano (2007: 2), we define
platforms as „systems of technologies that combine core components with complementary products
and services usually made by a variety of firms. “ Platforms spread across many industries, leading to
creation of new business areas and products. Moreover, they change the whole economic structure and
influence business strategies in fundamental ways.
The underlying structure of platforms is that of a network with the crucial feature of network effects.
That is, participants' profit depends on the number of other participants in the market (Katz and
Shapiro, 1985; Farell and Saloner, 1985). Direct network effects (or same-side effects) occur between
members of the same customer group, for instance, the more participants join a telephone network, the
more people can be reached, the higher is the utility of a single participant. Indirect network effects (or
cross-side effects) occur between members of the disjunct groups like developers and users. That is,
the more developers join a platform, the higher is users' benefit. Strategic management literature on
platform management (e.g. Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Eisenmann, 2007) provides practical
guidelines on how to deal with these effects. However, it does not provide an adequate theoretical
framework to thoroughly analyze the complex interactions. Economic literature, on the other hand,
focuses on the theoretical aspects of two-sided markets, and is not so much devoted to the managerial
implications of these theories. With this paper, we aim to bring these two streams of literature closer
together. The main contribution of our paper is then the applications of the theoretical findings to the
app platform industry: We show what strategic decisions are most important in the different life-cycles
stages of an app platform. We will cover mainly the app platform owner's perspective, leaving
developers' and customers' perspectives for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a literature review on platform
analysis and two-sided market models in section 2. Subsequently, we consider app platforms for
mobile devices in section 3. Section 4 pertains to strategic issues and insights structured according to
the three life cycle phases (design, launch, and competition). Although we focus on app platforms for
mobile devices as an underlying industry, the insights apply to many other Internet-based platforms.
Section 5 concludes and points out interesting aspects for further research

2

Literature Review and Background

In this section we provide the background for platform analysis. We begin with a short literature
overview on platforms and two-sided markets and then explain the key economic principles of twosided market models. The focus is on understanding the main features and their implications.

2.1

Platforms

In recent years, in many (especially high-tech) industries, platform competition became a key element
(Evans et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Hidding et al. (2011) identify four fundamental
drivers for the rise of platforms: Modularity, increased interconnectivity, self-organization, and low
marginal cost of production. Given the increased number of industries with platform character, it is
not surprising that management literature on this topic is growing. Main research directions include
network analysis, platform competition, and management of complementors, which will be described
shortly in the following paragraphs.
In the literature on networks, platforms perform a key role among actors (Eaton et al., 2010).
Platforms, as a bottleneck, may constrain the overall performance (Baldwin and Clark, 2006) and limit
the service level of the network (Teece, 1986). On the other hand, the gate keeping position allows the
platform owner to extract a significant proportion of the economic value of the network (Baldwin and
Clark (2006)) and thus sustain a competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). Basole (2009) shows how a
structural analysis of networks can be used to visualize the ecosystem of actors. This can be used to
identify a platform's competitive position and characterize its business strategy.
The literature on platform competition addresses what business and technology decisions help
companies to become and to stay platform leaders (Gawer and Cusumanu, 2008). While there is a
certain advantage of being first to market (established customer base, switching costs, network
effects), Hidding et al. (2011) find that in their sample of 15 platform industries, only in one market
the first mover is still the leader. Successful followers mainly used a „platform envelopment strategy“
(Eisenmann et al., 2007), which means that the entrant combines its own functionality with the leader's
platform in order to leverage shared user relationships and common components.
Companies providing complementary services are crucial, since they significantly enhance the
platform's value. Platforms owners should therefore pay close attention to how they attract and
manage their complementors. In an extensive case study on Intel's strategy, Gawer and Henderson
(2007) find that Intel established a good balance of encouraging entry, despite the fact that Intel has
the potential to „squeeze“ entrants ex post. Related to this issue is the level of openness of a platform.
Parker and van Alstyne (2009) analyze the tension between innovation and open access. In essence,
they find that the platform sponsor has to establish a balance between fostering platform adoption and
complementary investment versus capturing immediate profits on the platform itself. Eisenmann
(2007) analyzes factors that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing new platforms.
For the subsequent life-cycle stages (network mobilization and platform maturity) he explains how
management challenges differ between these two types of platforms.
While the strategic management literature clearly provides several valuable recommendations for
platform management, it does not provide an adequate theoretical framework to fully describe the
complex network interactions. Therefore, we now turn to the (more theory-based) economic literature
on two-sided markets.

2.2

Two-sided markets

Two-sided markets can be roughly defined as platforms that enable interaction between two groups of
customers that value each other's presence (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Evans, 2003; Tag, 2008). The
research on two-sided markets stems from network economics and complementary product pricing (cf.
Rochet and Tirole, 2003). One of the key concepts for two-sided markets is that of „indirect network
effects“: The utility on the one side of the market increases with the number (and/or quality) of
participants on the other side. Due to the diversity of two-sided market examples (e.g. credit cards,
night clubs, shopping malls) various extensions are needed to describe different kinds of platforms.
A large body of literature on two-sided markets has emerged during the last decade, for example,
Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Evans (2003) and Armstrong (2006), to

name just a few. A lot of new extensions to the original models were introduced (see Armstrong
(2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) on membership fees, Hagiu (2009), Jeon and Rochet (2010) on
quality preferences, Tag (2008) on comparison of open and closed platforms);
Two-sided market models are usually based on three equations: the platform profit equation and the
two utility equations for the two market sides (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). All of them can have a
membership and a usage part. Membership benefits, fees and costs are induced only once, usage
benefits, fees, and costs are recurring and depend on the number of transactions, e.g., downloads.
The key insight used in two-sided market models is that the solution does not only depend on the total
fee level, but on the pricing structure. Traditional economic intuition suggests that if prices for both
sides are equal in the beginning, a price increase is more effective on the side with a steeper demand
curve, while a reduction will be more effective on the side with the less steep curve. This still holds for
the two-sided markets. What is new in the two-sided market theory, is that in equilibrium, the ratio of
fees for the two market sides should be proportional to the ratio of their price elasticities (not the other
way around). The side with the lower price elasticity pays less than the other side and is even often
subsidized („subsidy side“) to attract the other side („money side“).
For the model to reflect the app platforms structure, the basic model by Rochet and Tirole (2003) must
be adjusted. We have to consider additional parameters and extensions like usage fees, membership
fees (Armstrong, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2006), segmentation of participants, commission payments
and adjustments for the number of interactions (Kouris, 2011). Understanding the impact of these
extensions is key for addressing challenges pertaining to app platform stakeholders.
For the competition between platforms multi-homing is an important issue. „Multi-homing“ refers to
the situation when participants might join more than one platform (Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006),
Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Sun and Tse (2007)). Each market participant can
choose between three possibilities: do not join any platform, join only one platform („single-homing“)
or join more than one platform („multi-homing“). The single-homing behavior can be driven by
requirements imposed by platforms, like exclusive contracts. Alternatively, it can be driven by costs of
multi-homing, for instance, when platforms are incompatible or require high membership fees.
Another key factor for the platform competition are same-side effects. There are networks with
positive same side effect, for instance, for the computer users, file exchange is only possible if they
work with the same (or a compatible) operating system. For many networks, they are negative due to
crowding out and increasing competition: the more developers participate on a platform, the lower the
attention a single developer is getting. For app platforms both effects exist.
Given the theoretical insights of this stream of literature, we now aim to derive managerial
implications for app platforms, using also the findings of the strategic management literature on
platforms. Therefore, we first describe the app platform industry and the key stakeholders.
Consequently, we discuss how insights from the two-sided market theory can be applied to address
strategic challenges arising in the app platform industry and how they affect business models in these
markets.

3

App platforms

App platforms are a special form of electronic markets. Via app platforms software developers can
distribute their software applications (apps) among users of mobile devices. Hence, developers and
users are indirectly connected: developers get profit from the users purchasing their apps and users
benefit from the apps. The groups are not disjunct, since some users are also developers and many
developers are also users, but they are distinct enough. Due to these direct and indirect network
effects, app platforms can be analyzed using two-sided market theory. In this section we provide
background information on app platforms and show, which parameters from the two-sided market

theory are relevant for app platforms. The industry overview and the description of key stakeholders
create a basis for understanding key challenges and issues of the industry.

3.1

Industry overview

Apple's AppStore and Google's Android market are probably the most known app platforms. Actually,
there are many more app platforms than these two – and some of them were founded as early as 1999.
For example, Handango provides apps for mobile phones since 1999. But it was not until the AppStore
appeared that the app platforms have gained momentum. Several hypotheses can be provided to
explain why it was not before 2008 that app platforms have gained momentum, for example, usability
(size of screen), connectivity (3G and 4G coverage) or the hardware price could have contributed to
the app platform development. The launch of AppStore has changed the mobile phone industry in
practically all dimensions. After three years in the market there were 425,000 apps available in the
AppStore. The number of downloads exceeded 14,000,000,000 (Apple, 2011)).
The app platform industry as a whole was doing well in 2011, growing by around 78% and reaching
around USD 4 billion in revenues. Apple managed to stay the market leader, accounting for 75% of
the total market revenues, by far outpacing other market participants. Also projections for the future
are positive: Total revenue is estimated to jump to USD 5.6 billion in 2012, USD 6.9 billion in 2013
and USD 8.3 billion in 2014 (Kent, 2011). In 2011, Apple, Google, Nokia and RIM were the most
important players in the market. Apple will probably remain the leader for the next 2-3 years, but other
platforms will also gain traction. Android has currently high market shares in the smartphone market
(53% in the USA) and high sales (e.g., 61% in Germany in 2011). Windows and Nokia are constantly
losing market share (Nokia from around 70% in 2006 to fewer than 30% in 2011 number of handsets
worldwide), however, together they have an interesting value proposition for the future. Due to
consolidation and merging of mobile devices and computers, Windows can become the key player in
this process. Nokia has the capacity to produce low-cost devices that can boost sales as soon as the
high-end market is saturated (Virki, 2012).

3.2

Business models and key stakeholders

In this section, we provide a brief description of app platform business models and operations. There
are three key types of participants on app platforms: the platform owner, developers, and users.
Platform owners connect developers and users and provide rules and services. Developers program
apps and submit them to the platform, so that the users can download them. In the following, we
describe each group of participants in detail.
App platform owners provide the whole infrastructure (like user interface, server space, etc.) and
determine rules for the interaction between the two market sides. They can also provide information
about apps and developers and serve as a trusted third party by controlling app quality. Following
Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) we call the business model used by platforms an intermediary business
model. They distinguish between 4 major roles of intermediaries: dealer (resells goods), platform
operator (connects sellers and buyers), infomediary (facilitates information gathering and procession),
and trusted third party (certification agent). Many platforms have chosen a hybrid business model. The
main difference between a dealer and a platform operator is that the latter does not control the
transaction price in a direct way by buying and reselling products, they rather charge for the platform
membership and transactions. App platform owners are platform operators in the first place, some
combine it with infomediary and/or trusted third party roles. Neglecting some roles by certain
(prominent) players leaves room for entrants in this market to fulfill these duties.
App platforms can be classified in various ways. Based on Distimo (2011), we divide app platforms
into 4 categories: native platforms, pure mobile device manufacturers, mobile network operators, and
independent. Compared to Distimo, we suggest differentiating between native platforms (who provide
operating system and hardware) and pure mobile device manufacturers instead of device

manufacturers versus operating system developers. Our classification allows to take into account the
fact that many successful app platforms provide both, the hardware and the operating system (Apple,
BlackBerry, Nokia/Windows). Moreover, there are key strategic differences between companies
offering an integrated experience like Apple and BlackBerry versus those providing only hardware
like HTC. For instance, if an app platform provides an operating system and/or mobile hardware, it
can more easily assess whether apps would work well on their system. Hence, their own apps are
better adjusted to the other parts, can offer better functionality and they can also review third-party
apps with less effort. Mobile network operators have already a customer base and a billing system in
place, so that they can gain customers for the new products like apps fast and/or they can take over
payment procedure.
Native (or integrated) platforms belong to the largest (in terms of available apps and downloads) and
have the highest impact on the industry so far. These app platforms are built around different operating
systems and use different programming languages and software tools. Hence, compatibility is very
low. This is important for multi-homing and has an impact on the market structure. Due to the
explosion in the number of app platforms, challenges around platform competition are currently in the
focus of the app platform industry. However, there are also new platforms that get launched. For these
new entrants platform launch and design are most important. But also incumbent platforms should
from time to time re-evaluate their design and consider adjustments in the pricing and/or quality in
order to deter entrance of new platforms and stay competitive.
Developers program apps, which they submit to the app platform. In general, they are entitled to
choose app prices themselves. There are different pricing strategies, including „simply buy it“, „inapp-purchase“ and financing through advertisement (Gans, 2012). Key instruments to extract revenues
is that of versioning (lite vs. prime), free trials and personification (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The
first challenge for many developers is the question, which platform to join. App platforms do not
require single-homing (limitation to one platform), i.e., developers are allowed to develop for more
than one platform. Since apps are information goods (Shapiro and Varian, 1999), the main costs are
the fixed costs of programming, marginal costs are basically zero. But transition to another platform
causes costs of around 50% of the development cost due to the differences in programming language,
operating system and hardware. The possibilities to program universal apps that run on all platforms
are still very limited (Newel, 2011)).
The other market side of an app platform consists of its users. They determine which apps are
successful and, in the end, they decide which ecosystem will win. App platform users access the
platform through their mobile devices. Mobile devices are complementary goods and can be
considered a one-time membership fee. The features of mobile devices are key for the consumer
experience, they determine which apps can be installed and used. For the users, not only the apps
count, they rather see their mobile device and the software on it as a whole. Value and benefits are
determined by the ecosystem.

4

Key strategic issues and insights

Business models based on two-sided markets require consideration of strategic issues not present in
traditional models. In the following, we analyze what characteristics of app platforms are particularly
affected by the factors described in section 2. We structure our arguments along the three life cycle
stages described in Eisenmann (2007): platform design, launch, and competition.

4.1

Platform design

From a strategic perspective, it is first necessary to check the criteria for a product to become a
platform. Gawer and Cusumano (2007) argue that a product needs to (i) perform one essential function
or solves one essential problem for several actors in an industry, (ii) be easy to connect or build-upon,

and (iii) is difficult to substitute for. Clearly, the leading app platforms satisfy these criteria. In order to
make the platform successful, the authors then recommend a „coring strategy“, which aims at making
the platform the „core“ of a technological system. That was exactly the strategy implemented by
Apple when they realized the potential of AppStore: Before its launch the mobile industry was
organized around mobile devices and mobile network operators, with device features and network
coverage being the key differentiation factors. Since the AppStore launch, the mobile industry
structure changed profoundly, now having software (operating system plus apps) in the core (GfK,
2010). Hence, app platforms have recognized the importance of the coring strategy and managed to
apply it, arranging the whole mobile industry around them. Once this consideration is taken into
account, other important platform design issues should be considered, like pricing and quality settings.
It is a non-trivial decision, which side to subsidize (Eisenmann et al., 2006). For instance, in the video
game industry the consoles are sold to the users at or even below cost („subsidy side“). The
developer's side is the „money side“ and has to pay high royalties for the games development. In the
personal computer industry the situation is reversed: users pay high prices for the operating system
software while developers obtain free software development kits. The differences can be even
observed within one and the same industry – Apple tried to charge developers a USD 10,000 for the
Mac software development kit, but was not successful with this strategy having lost market shares in
mid 1990s to Windows and open source operating systems. On app platforms, we observe that users
are usually the „subsidy side“ and developers are the „money side“. Clearly, there are differences
between the platforms. Apple charges USD 600-800 for the iPad which costs around USD 300 in
production, Amazon charges only USD 200 for its Fire tablet – which is below manufacturing cost.
Amazon is aspiring to install another business model, extracting even more revenues from developers.
Hence, we observe that even within the app platform industry, there are different business models, but
most try to extract more revenues from the developers.
The second question pertains to the different kinds of fees that are applicable. In different industries
different kinds of fees are used. The two kinds that were considered in the two-sided markets literature
are membership fees (one-time or periodical) and usage fees. The membership fee (also called lump
sum, or access fee) is applied independently of interactions between the market sides. The membership
is especially helpful if transactions between participants cannot be observed, like on partner search
platforms. Usage fees apply per transaction.
Usually, it depends on the cost structure, what kind of fees should be used. Here not only the platform
cost structure but also the developers' cost and revenue structure is important. Usually, for information
goods like apps fixed costs are high and marginal cost are almost zero, or as Shapiro and Varian
(1999: 21) put it, „information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce.“ Contrarily, revenues are
obtained on a per-download basis. Generally, information goods like apps should be priced not based
on the production costs, but based on the value to the customers (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Thus, app
platforms can participate in the developers' success best if they charge a per transaction commission.
Besides the optimal price setting and allocation, quality of apps is an important issue. In the computer
console and game industry, game developers pay high royalties to the game console producers. This is
(at least partially) to ensure that low-quality games are not profitable and to exclude them from the
platform (Hagiu, 2009). Also for app platforms quality belongs to the key platform design factors. For
users it is important that downloaded apps at least do not contain malware, viruses, and spyware. That
is the first level of quality differentiation – and it is objective. The next level is that of usability and
content quality of apps. This may be perceived differently, and is therefore subjective. App platforms
differ in their attitude towards certification of the apps quality. Apple is known for its quite rigorous
approach: they review all apps before placing them in the AppStore. Other platforms like Android
market do not have a pre-placement review process, but they delete low-quality apps once in a while.
In addition to these kinds of quality-certification processes, every app platform has a ranking
mechanism in place so that users might indicate the subjectively perceived app quality by rating and
commenting it.

Theoretical analysis shows that on two-sided markets the side requiring higher quality (consumers)
should be subsidized (Hagiu, 2009; Eisenmann et al., 2006). In reality, we observe that on platforms
where a quality review process is installed (e.g. AppStore), app developers pay more. The exclusion of
the low quality apps leads to higher benefits for users, larger customer base, and through the indirect
network effects, to higher interest in developing for the high-quality platform. One more benefit for
developers is that negative same-side effects are reduced through exclusion, reducing the congestion
problem. Regarding platform quality, no general advice that would fit every situation can be given.
However, it is crucial for platforms to decide whether they would be differentiated by quality or
quantity. Those that cannot decide, can be easily dominated by other platforms in the one direction or
the other.

4.2

Platform launch

The so-called „chicken & egg“-problem is the main issue during the launch phase. Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) have used this expression in their first paper on two-sided markets. The key challenge on twosided markets is that a platform must get both customer sides on board to do business. But as long as
there are no users, no developers would join and vice versa. As explained in section 2.2 platform
owners' revenues consist of two parts, the membership and the usage part. When the usage component
is too small due to low numbers of participants, the membership part can be sufficient to get the
platform up and running. For that to happen, the membership component of utility and profit equations
must be high enough to compensate for low usage benefits. This provides an explanation also for the
phenomenal success of Apple's AppStore or Amazon's market place. Due to high membership
benefits, they managed to attract users first, and then developers and independent sellers followed very
fast. The first implication for the platform operators is, that new entrants may avoid the „chicken &
egg“ problem“ by charging low membership fees and providing high membership benefits. The
second implication is that later on, platforms might want to reassess their pricing strategy and adjust
pricing. In reality, we have not yet observed any major price changes. This could be an interesting
avenue for research (and also for the industry), to evaluate whether such changes would be profitable
and feasible in the current situation.
Once the platform is launched, openness of the platform appears to be a key strategic decision in a
two-sided market (Rysman, 2009). Most app platform owners pursue a proprietary strategy, which
means they have full control over the platform and therefore can capture most of the added value
themselves. Following Eisenmann (2007), this is the right strategy for leaders in the market.
Followers, however, might choose a more open, collaborative approach (i.e., cooperating with
competitors or complementors) in order to differentiate and exert competitive pressure.
When entering into an also existing market, it is of strategic importance if the remaining market is still
big enough to create substantial network effects or if it is possible to attract customers and developers
from the existing platforms. Eisenmann et al. (2007) and Hidding et al. (2011) describe platform
envelopment as a promising strategy for followers. Google successfully linked many platform markets
to its search platform (like Google Docs or Chrome) and naturally also used this position to support
Android. Through indirect network effects, market share of developers also affects users. As some key
developers (Cheezburger Network, Foursquare) considered Microsoft's market share too small to
justify development of a new app for the Windows Phone, Microsoft reacted by incentivizing
developers. Not only did Microsoft provide developers with free phones and prime spots in its app
store, in some cases Microsoft even financed the app development (Wortham and Wingfield, 2012).
This is similar to the strategy of in-house complements described in Eisenmann (2007).

4.3

Platform competition

Many managers in the mobile industry wonder whether app platforms will show the „winner-takesall“ dynamics or allow for existence of several competitors. This question is crucial for all business

areas around mobile ecosystems. Winner-takes-all dynamics emerges due to network effects and
increasing returns to scale. For instance, the market for keyboards is 100% dominated by the
„qwerty“-keyboard (with small variations). On the video market, VHS format wiped out Sony's
Betamax video format. At the same time, there are markets where several platforms coexist. For
instance, there are several web-browsers like Mozilla Firefox, Safari, Chrome, Internet Explorer. Also
the market for the computer operating systems is divided between several companies (Windows, iOS,
Linux and Unix). The crucial question is then, how to decide whether the „winner-takes-all“ dynamic
will occur in the app platform market or not.
There are 4 conditions that follow from the two-sided market theory and make the „winner-takes-all“
dynamics probable (see Eisenmann et al., 2006; Sun and Tse, 2007):
1. It is costly to multi-home – at least for one market side,
2. There are high indirect network effects – at least for the side with high multi-homing costs,
3. Same-side effects are not negative and strong, that is, the congestion effect is not too high,
4. The goods are rather homogeneous and there is no demand for differentiation.
The first condition pertains to multi-homing. To „multi-home“ means to have access to more than one
platform as explained in section 2.2. If platforms are not perfectly compatible, multi-homing incurs
costs, like additional equipment or the time necessary to learn how to use other platforms. In case of
app platforms the incompatibility is quite high: different app platforms use different operating
systems, different programming languages and they run on different mobile devices with different
functionality. For instance, it is costly to port an app that was created for iOS to Android or Windows.
Developers must possess both programming languages and know the differences between them. They
also must know the differences in the operating systems and in the middleware of both platforms.
Additionally, developers have to buy hardware and for some platforms, membership fees must be
paid. For consumers, multi-homing costs are also high. In order to use more than one native app
platform, users have to purchase and carry more than one mobile device, which would be
incompatible. In addition, there is a lock-in effect: if a user has spent some money and time for the
apps on the one platform, she might be reluctant to switch the system. Altogether we can conclude that
the cost of multi-homing is quite high for both market sides on app platforms. That supports
consolidation of the market toward a single platform.
Developers can only make profits if there are users who would download and buy their apps. Hence,
indirect network effects are relatively high. That causes the participants of the app market to converge
to one platform. Once there is a clear leader, other platforms' chances to get enough customers
diminish. Vogelsang (2010) shows that these network effects increase the possibility of entry
deterrence by incumbents. As a consequence, the market leader does not exploit monopoly profits in
early stages of the market, but rather in more mature stage. Hence, the second condition applies as
well and reinforces consolidation.
The effect of the third condition is not as clear as that of the first two. On the developers' side, there
are negative same-side effects, since they prefer to have fewer competitors. With more than half a
million apps on a platform, the marginal visibility and utility of an additional app diminishes. Then
other things like quality and variety of apps and good platform infrastructure become more and more
important. On the users' side, there are positive same-side effect: people can share apps and
communicate easily. For instance, they may use the same chat apps, some of which are also platformspecific, e.g., BlackBerry messenger. Altogether we can say that negative same-side effect might work
against platform consolidation.
The fourth condition implies that if different features are needed, there might be room for niche
building and therefore for more than one platform. Hence, the effect of the fourth condition is also not
obvious. On the users' side, there are different customer segments: there are, for instance, business
customers with preference for security, very high quality, and ability to pay for it on the one hand, on

the other hand, there are budgeters who are not willing to pay much, and nerds who want the
opportunity to adjust apps as they wish, etc. All these customer groups have different needs. While it
is possible to serve all of them on one platform, it allows for specialized platforms to co-exist. Also
developers are different, for instance, in terms of their motives (Harhoff et al., 2003). Hence, there are
still opportunities for niche-building and co-existence of several platforms.
The factors discussed above arise from the two-sided market theory and impact the app platforms'
business models and strategy. Besides these factors, there are several other aspects that are not part of
two-sided market theory but must be taken into account when talking about app platforms' strategies.
These are for instance, brand image of the platform owner and the platform ecosystem, possible
disruptions like new coalitions between key players, new mobile devices, trends from the neighboring
industries like smart home, and question regarding possible vertical integration. These aspects must be
taken into account when considering strategic issued on app platforms.
Summarizing all said in this subsection, we can conclude that the app platform industry shows a high
tendency towards convergence but it leaves room for niche building and differentiation. Moreover,
this market is subject to a wide range of innovations, including technologies and services. It is crucial
to develop unique features, bundle products, and provide incentives to complementors to innovate in
order to stay competitive. Gawer and Cusumano (2008) call this a „tipping strategy“ for platform
owners. The key issue for the incumbent app platforms is to push further for consolidation. Possible
challengers have to look for their niche to be successful. And developers should not spread their
resources too much and carefully scan the market for disruptions and trends towards consolidation.

5

Conclusion

In this paper we have analyzed issues and strategies of the app platform industry from a two-sided
market perspective. We combined the strategic management literature on platforms with the economic
literature on two-sided markets in order to have a solid background for our analysis of the app
platform industry. We have analyzed the current industry situation and trends, platform business
model, and key stakeholders. Building on existing literature and the industry analysis, we have
discussed key strategic issues in the app platform industry. Along the life cycle of a platform (launch,
design, and competition) we developed several management recommendations and perspectives for
this industry.
We have seen that two-sided market business models require consideration of strategic issues not
present in traditional models. These issues may pertain to all development phases, including platform
design, launch, and competition. For platform design, pricing represents the key strategic challenge.
Two-sided market theory suggests that in equilibrium fees should be proportional to the price
elasticities (contrary to the usual economic intuition). Furthermore, it provides suggestions regarding
kinds of fees to charge (usage, membership, one-time or periodical fees). Subsequently, we have
discussed the impact of quality on platform design. Quality is besides prices the key parameter that
determines platform design. On two-sided markets, the side that requires higher quality gets
subsidized. During platform launch, the „chicken & egg“ problem occurs. Two-sided market theory
helps to understand and reduce or avoid it through setting of an optimal membership component.
Platform competition pertains to the possible market structure – „winner takes all“ dynamics and the
number of competing platforms that can share the market. Four factors specific for the two-sided
markets influence the market structure: multi-homing, size of indirect network effects, same-side
effects, and differentiation opportunities. Our analysis points out that the app platform industry shows
a high tendency towards convergence but leaves room for niche building and differentiation. The key
implication for the incumbent app platforms is to push further for consolidation while possible
challengers have to look for their niche to be successful. For developers it is crucial to scan the market
for disruptions and trends towards consolidation in order to efficiently allocate their resources.

For the future research agenda, we suggest three points for further investigation from a theoretical as
well as from an applied perspective. The first pertains to the pricing strategy reassessment for different
development phases, which seems to be recommendable from the theoretical point of view but is not
observed in reality. However, as important as the pricing aspect in these markets appear, other factors,
like creating a trustworthy relationship with complementors, encouraging internal and external
innovation, and reacting strategically to competitors' actions (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002) must not
be neglected. The second aspect concerns empirical evaluation of compliance to the fee allocation
rule. This requires empirical estimation of price elasticities of the two market sides on different app
platforms. The third factor that appears interesting is the level of openness (Eisenmann (2007) and the
strategic perspective of developers. Collaboration of developers and openness of platform naturally
has a big effect on this side of the market which deserves further analysis.
Altogether, two-sided market theory proves to be helpful in addressing strategic issues of app
platforms snd provides tools to analyze business models and during all development phases.
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